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ABSTRACT 
This paper, a contribution to the "proto-industrialization" debate, examines the relative 
advantages of urban and rural locations for cloth manufacturing in later-medieval England 
and the Low Countries. From the eleventh to the mid-fourteenth century, when the 
English cloth trade began its seemingly inexorable expansion, the Low Countries had 
enjoyed a virtual supremacy in international cloth markets, then chiefly located in the 
Mediterranean basin. The traditional view has attributed the ultimate English victory to 
the advantages of a rural location, using cheap labour and water-powered fulling. The 
proponents of this view further contend that in late thirteenth-century England a new 
rural industry had displaced a centuries-old "traditional" urban cloth industry through such 
superior cost advantages. To challenge that view, this paper puts forth the following pro- 
positions : (I) that England's traditional urban industry had declined, abruptly from the 
1290s, chiefly because of steeply rising, war-induced, transaction costs in Mediterranean 
markets for its chief products: i.e., cheap and light fabrics, which they had sold as price 
takers; (2) that the Flemish/Brabantine cloth industries, having had a similar industrial- 
commercial orientation, suffered from the same industrial crisis; and more quickly 
responded by reorienting production, as price makers, to the very high-priced luxury 
woollens; (3) that rural locations were not always more advantageous, in lower labour 
and other costs; (4) that urban locations offered important benefits for luxury-cloth pro- 
duction : a more highly skilled, productive, better regulated labour force; urban and guild 
institutions to enforce necessary quality controls and promote international reputations 
for high quality; (5) that England's cloth industry, when it revived from the 1360s, fol- 
lowed suit in shifting to more luxury-oriented exports, while gaining its chief advantages 
from the fiscal burdens imposed on high-quality wool exports to its overseas competi- 
tors ; (6) that English export-oriented cloth production also remained more urban than 
rural until the late fifteenth century (for many complex reasons explored in this paper). 
The proto-industrialization debate revisited: urban vs. rural locations for textile 
manufactures in later-medieval and early modern Europe 
In the view of many economic historians, the industrial and commer- 
cial supremacy that the southern Low Countries had so long enjoyed 
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in northern Europe, from the eleventh to fourteenth centuries, had been 
based primarily upon a strongly welded symbiosis between towns and 
textiles, but one that ironically contained the very seeds of this region's 
relative economic decline during the later fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
turies. In most traditional concepts of that symbiosis, towns were fun- 
damentally necessary for the expansion of this region's world-renowned 
cloth industries, whose exports in turn provided the most powerful 
dynamics for urban growth during the High Middle Ages: especially in 
Flanders, adjacent Artois, and then Brabant.' If Holland's somewhat 
later urbanization was based more on maritime trade, brewing indus- 
tries, and the herring fisheries, woollen textiles were still vitally impor- 
tant for the growth of such towns as Leiden and Den Haag.2 Thus, 
long serving as Europe's leading cloth exporters, the Low Countries col- 
lectively became the wealthiest, most densely populated, and most highly 
urbanized region north of the Alps, certainly by the thirteenth century.3 
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Many of these historians have also contended, however, that during 
the next century this mutually beneficial symbiosis was ruptured, so that 
an urban location became more and more inimical to the future of the 
traditional woollen draperies in both Flanders and Brabant, just as it 
had been somewhat earlier to the English textile industries. According 
to this pessimistic view, best articulated by Henri Pirenne, their scle- 
rotic urban industries, first in England and then in the Low Countries, 
increasingly lost markets to internal domestic competition from new, 
upstart rural draperies. For the Low Countries' urban draperies, how- 
ever, the truly fatal blow came from the rapidly expanding English cloth 
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trade, during the later fourteenth century, based upon a newly vibrant, 
"free," low-cost industry that had also become almost entirely rural in 
structure; but many of the rural nouvelles draperies in Flanders and Brabant 
were far better able to weather this English competition and prosper 
into the sixteenth century, again primarily because of similar advan- 
tages from their low-cost rural location. 
Thus Pirenne and many subsequent historians have contended that, 
in Flanders, the leading towns of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, known as 
the drie steden, and, in neighbouring Brabant, the comparable drie steden 
of Brussels, Leuven, and Mechelen must themselves bear the major 
responsibility for the subsequent "decline and fall" of this region's tra- 
ditional woollen cloth industry. In their view, these towns subjected their 
draperies to oppressive guild controls, excessive taxation, high living 
costs, and consequently overly expensive labour. More specifically, the 
urban textile guilds, backed by the towns' judicial and police powers, 
are accused of engaging in a litany of sins: of restricting entry and con- 
trolling production in order to protect their members' employment and 
incomes; of imposing rigid industrial regulations that impeded techno- 
logical innovation and stifled entrepreneurial initiative; and of foment- 
ing dissension in political power struggles that disastrously disrupted 
production. The Flemish town governments and guilds were also guilty, 
in this general view, of impeding the industry's migration to the much 
freer and industrially more amenable countryside: to gain freedom from 
guild and urban controls; to escape high taxation; and thus to seek pre- 
sumably lower-cost peasant labour.4 They also argue that medieval 
England's towns had never enjoyed the power to prevent the much ear- 
lier and more advantageous exodus of their draperies to adjacent or 
more distant rural locations, especially in the West Country, providing 
those crucial advantages that best explain how the English cloth indus- 
try managed to defeat most of its continental rivals, most especially the 
still urban-based draperies of the Low Countries. 
Such a transition of textile manufacturing from urban to rural loca- 
tions seems to have been a widespread phenomenon in late-medieval 
and early modern Europe. Currently highlighting its significance is the 
Proto-Industrialization thesis, whose leading proponent, the late Franklin 
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Mendels, contended that, in early modern Europe, "the rapid growth 
of traditionally organized but market-oriented rural industry ... induced 
the passage to modern industry," by serving "as an effective dissolver 
of the traditional agrarian structure" and by providing "a means of 
rapidly increasing industrial production."5 Though such interpretations 
may well have some merit for early modern Europe in general, a counter- 
thesis can be argued for the later-medieval Low Countries, in defence 
of both towns and urban institutions: that they rescued their cloth indus- 
tries from seemingly certain destruction in the fourteenth century and 
staved off ultimate, inevitable decline for almost a hundred years. From 
the mid-fifteenth century, however, their urban institutions may bear 
some lesser share of blame for the final and much more rapid decline 
of the traditional Flemish and Brabantine draperies, though this argu- 
ment may be deemed moot.? 
Any examination of these theses debating the relative advantages of 
urban and rural industrial locations must begin, however, by ascertain- 
ing why European textile industries had been so predominantly urban 
during the High Middle Ages, from the eleventh to early fourteenth 
centuries. The reason most commonly offered is that towns were then 
islands of relative freedom and economic security within a vast, often 
chaotic rural feudal sea of peasant servitude. As Robert Lopez has 
observed, the widespread medieval urban symbol was a circle enclos- 
ing a cross, representing commercial crossroads within fully protective 
circular walls.' According to such views, many towns lost that relative 
advantage, at least for manufacturing industries, during the later Middle 
Ages, with the expansion and better enforcement of princely authority, 
the disintegration of rural seigniorialism, the diffusion of a market econ- 
omy into the countryside, and a growing agricultural productivity that 
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together liberated cheap peasant labour for industrial activities, espe- 
cially in textile manufacturing under a "putting-out" ( herlag) system. As 
many historians have reasonably contended, peasant labour accepted 
wages inferior to those for urban labour because rural living costs were 
generally so much lower, and because so many artisans provided only 
part-time or supplemental labour, while producing their own food and 
working within their own homes as peasant craftsmen.8 
The Van Werveke thesis on industrial location and guild strife in Flemish 
textile crafts 
In explaining the eleventh-century urban origins of the Flemish draperies, 
the eminent Belgian historian Hans Van Werveke argued, however, that 
the surrounding countzyside, in this relatively advanced region, was not 
subjected to any oppressive form of "feudal servitude"; and thus that it 
offered as much freedom and security as were then to be found in the 
towns, which themselves were often prone to violence-so aptly demon- 
strated in Galbert's chronicle The Murder of Charles the Good (1127-28).9 
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For Van Weverke, if we may view his ideas through the lens of modern 
economic theory, the major advantage for the towns was in offering more 
direct supervision and thus lower transaction costs for export-oriented 
cloth production, with a necessarily intricate division of labour; and, for 
his thesis, that was all the more crucial in an era when most merchants 
and drapers were presumably illiterate, innumerate, and thus unable to 
utilize the complex bookkeeping that would have been required for an 
alternative industrial organization dispersed throughout the countryside, 
but linking villages (for production) with towns (for marketing).'° As Van 
Werveke notes, not until 1179 did Flemish merchants begin to enjoy 
the benefits of an institutional secular education (first in Ghent)." Few 
if any historians, however, have taken Van Werveke's illiteracy thesis 
seriously as an explanation for urban industrial locations in this era; 
and it is surely contradicted by the subsequent expansion of major urban 
cloth industries, first in Brabant, then in Italy, Holland, and Normandy, 
the latter by the mid-fourteenth century, after their mercantile-industrial 
entrepreneurs had long become fully literate and numerate.12 Yet Van 
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Werveke's implicit concept of supervision and transaction costs, deserv- 
ing more serious consideration than it has so far received, will be revis- 
ited later in this study.' 3 
The rest of Van Werveke's rather complex thesis is even more impor- 
tant in illuminating the severe internal conflicts that beset the Flemish 
cloth industry from the later thirteenth century, i.e., the essence of his 
anti-urban case. In his view, Flemish merchant-drapers had found little 
incentive to shift cloth production to rural sites in the uncertain hope 
of lowering costs, so long as foreign competition offered little threat to 
the supremacy and profitability of the Flemish-Artesian urban draperies. 
But from the 1260s (if not earlier), when such an external threat did 
indeed emerge from neighbouring Brabantine cloth towns, some Flemish 
merchant-drapers did begin to subcontract production to adjacent rural 
draperies, or to supplement their textile inventories from such sources. 
Not surprisingly, the quasi-guilds (ambachten) of textile craftsmen in the 
major Flemish towns strenuously opposed any such rural manufactur- 
ing that threatened their own livelihoods. They also fiercely resisted the 
alternative policy of the merchant-draper oligarchies, who then firmly 
controlled the town governmcnts: wage regulation to reduce that cost 
differential, a policy particularly painful in an era of steadily rising pop- 
ulation and soaring food prices.'4 
In brief, according to this and other related interpretations, leaders 
of the textile crafts sought aid from the Flemish count, Guy de Dampierre, 
who had his own agenda in opposing the governing urban oligarchies; 
and those town governments in turn appealed to the count's overlord, 
the French king, Philip IV. Politically complex, bitter, occasionally bloody 
strife ensued from the 1270s, culminating in the famous Battle of the 
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Golden Spurs at Kortrijk (Courtrai), in July 1302, when the count's 
forces and Flemish urban militias (the clauwaerts), dominated by textile 
craftsmen, surprisingly defeated the French cavalry and helped over- 
throw the pro-French leliaert merchant oligarchies. "7' 
In many common Pirenne-influenced interpretations, the urban craft 
guilds subsequently gained strong aldermanic representation in the restruc- 
tured, supposedly more "democratic" Flemish town governments, while 
merchants, merchant-drapers, and others of the so-called poorterie, now 
supposedly weakened by steadily growing foreign dominance in the tex- 
tile trades, found themselves relegated to a lesser political status." Yet, 
just two years after their humiliation at Kortrijk, the French defeated 
the Flemish forces, by sea at Zierikzee, and on land at Mons-en-P6v?le 
(1304), forcing the Flemish towns and the count (now Robert de Bethune) 
to accept the onerous Peace of Athis-sur-Orge (1305), which, inter alia, 
required the Flemish to surrender their major cloth towns of Lille and 
Douai, pay a crushing indemnity, and compensate all despoiled leliae,rts. 
If by no means all of the Flemish poorterie were necessarily leliae,rts, the 
poorterie evidently continued to dominate most of the Flemish town gov- 
ernments, usually in alliance with other socio-economic factions, at least 
up to the revolutionary era of Jacob Van Artevelde (a landowning poorier), 
from 1338 to 1349, when the count's forces overthrew the weaver- 
dominated regime, which, in July 1345, had replaced that of the assas- 
sinated Van Artevelde. 
During the post-Kortrijk years, to be sure, the Flemish urban craft 
guilds did obtain fuller legal recognition, with town-sanctioned charters, 
considerable jurisdictional powers, and the right to choose their own 
deans and officers; and many guild craftsmen did become aldermanic 
schepenen (échevins), though usually as individuals rather than as formal 
guild representatives (in Ghent, at least, before the 1360s)." To the 
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extent that the urban textilc crafts did gain much greater independence 
and at least some indirect role in the town governments, their limited 
victory was only a Pyrrhic one that served to exacerbate labour strife 
within the Flemish urban cloth industry during the fourteenth century. 
In the drie steden of Ghent, Ypres, and Bruges, aldermanic members 
from the textile guilds could exercise influence only as individuals in 
collaboration with the poorterie and other craft and mercantile guilds, 
who frequently exploited the growing divisions amongst the two leading 
textile crafts, the weaver-drapers and fullers; and in Ghent the shearer- 
finishers and dyers were relegated to the kleine neringe or small-guilds 
collective. " 
By the early to mid-fourteenth century, with the economic decline of 
the merchant-drapers, the organization of the Flemish cloth industry 
had fundamentally changed. Dependent on other merchants, foreign 
(Italian, German, English) and domestic, for wool supplies and cloth- 
marketing, the master-weavers had become the dominant industrial entre- 
preneurs : buying and putting-out the wools, organizing production, hiring 
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combers, carders, spinners, weaving assistants-and also fullers. Of these 
employees, only the fullers were guild-organized, with some power to 
contest the wages that the weaver-drapers sought to impose, while the 
professional dyers and shearers earned fees, not wages, from various 
clients: domestic drapers, brokers, and foreign merchants. With very 
narrow profit margins, the weaver-drapers, in Van Werveke's view, were 
caught in a worsening cost-price squeeze during the fourteenth century, 
between chiefly foreign merchants, for both wool and cloth. Such adverse 
circumstances were gravely aggravated by sharp increases in English 
wool prices, and the growth of foreign competition in European cloth 
markets, which were now suffering ever more severe contraction, with 
chronic warfare, then plagues, and consequent depopulation. T'hus, as 
he argued, many of the urban revolts and civil wars of the fourteenth 
century directly or indirectly involved clashes between weavers and fullers 
over control of urban industrial and wage legislation.'9 Other urban 
revolts were directed against the count, for varied reasons much too 
complex to discuss here. But all of these post-Kortrijk revolts (1319-20, 
1323-28, 1337-49, 1360-61, 1379-85), manifesting the cloth towns' eco- 
nomic and political instability, and thus frequently involving foreign mil- 
itary intervention, seriously disrupted production and marketing, to the 
obvious advantage of their foreign competitors.2° For late-medieval 
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Flanders, certainly, this criticism that guilds posed an impediment to 
textile manufacturing through their habitual strife may stand. At the 
same time, however, it must also be admitted that urban draperies else- 
where in the Low Countries, especially in Leiden, were not free from 
similar if much less bloody and prolonged industrial strife, even though 
their textile craft-guilds did not exercise the same political powers as 
those in the Flemish towns.2' 
Obviously, with such worsening urban political and economic con- 
ditions, Flanders did experience some relative shift of textile production 
from the drie steden to smaller towns and to some villages in the "coun- 
tryside" during the fourteenth century, even though small-town and 
village cloth-making had become quite substantial by the thirteenth cen- 
tury,22 Somewhat surprisingly, Van Werveke understated the growth of 
rural cloth-making in later-medieval Flanders. In his view, "rural" or 
small-town draperies successfully flourished only in south-west Flanders, 
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where Ypres, the weakest of Flanders' drie .steden, failed to enforce its 
ban on rural cloth-making within its own castellany during the four- 
teenth and fifteenth centuries." 
That view, however, though repeated by many historians, requires 
some significant qualifications." The drie steden were never empowered 
to suppress the many small-town or quasi-village draperies that had 
already obtained comital or seigniorial charters. Furthermore, the drie 
steden, who themselves evidently continued to rely on rural yarn produc- 
tion, tolerated much rural textile manufacturing, while concentrating 
their opposition on those village draperies that were imitating their own 
fine woollens. Certainly from the 1330s, the drie steden had much to fear 
on these very grounds from the growth of the so-called nouvelles draperie.s, 
many located in various small towns and villages of south-west Flanders, 
but most outside the jurisdiction of the drie steden. Finally, Van Werveke's 
contention that, by the mid-fifteenth century, these nouvelles draperies had 
"succeeded in outstripping the old urban industry," a view commanding 
widespread support, deserves a closer scrutiny that must be postponed 
until later in this study." 
Ertgland's industrial transformations in textile manufacturing: the "urban industrial 
crisis," rural cloih-making and rural fulling-mills, ca. 1290-1340 
As just noted, however, the Flemish urban draperies had encountered 
a far more dangerous threat during the fourteenth century from England, 
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whose cloth industry had supposedly already undergone a complete 
transformation from an urban to a rural structure. During the later 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, cloth-making had indeed been a major 
industrial activity in most of England's leading towns, especially along 
the eastern seaboard-in York, Lincoln, Louth, Stamford, Beverley, 
Winchester, Oxford, Nottingham, Leicester, Gloucester, Exeter, Coventry, 
Norwich, and London itself; but, according to most historians, these 
urban industries were suffering irredeemable decay by the early four- 
teenth century.26 
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In a renowned thesis that used to dominate the literature, the late 
Eleanora Carus-Wilson provided a very plausible explanation for not 
only this rural transformation but also for the English cloth industry's 
subsequent victory over all its foreign rivals: an "industrial revolution 
of the thirteenth century" in the spread of water-powered fulling mills 
Fulling, it must be stressed, was an absolutely essential process in pro- 
ducing genuine heavy-weight good quality woollens, using a combination 
of water, soap, fullers' earth (hydrous aluminum silicates), urine, along 
with high levels of pressure and heat for pounding the woven cloth: in 
order to scour and cleanse it of the butter and other oils used in prepar- 
ing the yarns, and to force the very short, fine, scaly-fibred wool fibres 
to shrink, interlock, and mat together as felted cloth. Traditionally, this 
process, which shrank the surface area by as much as 50 percent, thus 
giving the cloth its great density and weight, had been achieved under- 
foot, as it were, through the arduous labour of two or three men who 
trampled upon the woven cloth in a vat containing this unpleasant mix- 
ture, over a period of three to five days. The water-powered mill, using 
two very large and heavy oaken hammers, pounding the cloth up to 
40 times a minute, could achieve the same task with one man in a 
matter of hours. In contrast to the manufacture of true woollens, most 
cheap, coarse, light-weight textiles----such as worsteds, says, serges, biffes, 
stamforts, ete.-underwent only very cursory fulling, chiefly scouring to 
cleanse the cloth, or much less extensive fulling, for those hybrid serge- 
type fabrics composed of short-stapled, greased, woollen wefts, and long- 
stapled dry worsted warps." 
Undoubtedly Carus-Wilson did exaggerate the benefits and conse- 
quences of mechanized fulling, thereby inviting those attacks that have 
largely, though quite unjustly, succeeded in discrediting her thesis. In 
the first major assault, Edward Miller doubted that mechanized fulling 
"could have had the large [economic] consequences attributed to it," when 
"fulling then accounted for about 7-12 percent of the cost of the main 
manufacturing processes."" Furthermore, in replying to Carus-Wilson's 
15 
point that manorial lords had spurred the growth of a rural and a much 
more mechanized industry by investing in fulling mills, Miller noted 
that such lords would have exploited their monopoly powers over cloth- 
working tenants-powers that Carus-Wilson herself had emphasized- 
by charging relatively high fees (rent.r, for economists), which prob- 
ably would have eliminated any cost advantage of fulling-mills.3° In an 
even more trenchant and convincing criticism, A. R. Bridbury contended 
that, during the later thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the very 
era of Carus-Wilson's supposed "industrial revolution," any resort to 
fulling mills would likely have raised production costs, not lowered 
them, by substituting very expensive capital for what had become dirt- 
cheap labour in a now densely populated country, especially in the grain- 
growing or mixed farming regions of the Midlands, East Anglia, and 
the south-east." 
Apart from A. R. Bridbury, few of Carus-Wilson's critics have ques- 
tioned her view that the English countryside did offer the later-medieval 
textile industry significant advantages for all, or virtually all, of the indus- 
trial processes of cloth-manufacturing, including fulling. Indeed, Miller 
and several other historians have argued that during the later thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries, many urban clothiers, burdened by ris- 
ing industrial costs, soaring taxes, and rigid guild restrictions, deserted 
the traditional eastern textile towns to relocate in the countryside, as 
the only effective competitive response to a supposed influx of suppos- 
edly cheaper and better quality Flemish woollens.32 The primary rural 
locations so chosen for the "new" English cloth industries, however, were 
not those adjacent to the major textile towns of eastern lowland England 
(in Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Leicestershire, Huntingdonshire, 
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Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Middlesex), but primarily in the West 
Country (Devon, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Wiltshire) 
and secondarily in East Anglia (Suffolk and Essex). That geographical 
shift is more or less ignored by Carus-Wilson's critics, who focus instead 
on the obvious, oft-proclaimed benefits of a rural location in general, 
veritably as a mantra: freedom from guilds, freedom from urban govern- 
ments and their taxes, and low-wage and thus presumably lower-cost 
peasant labour." Such factors were not only more important than fulling 
mills but preceded them as well, in the sense that such mills spread 
only after cloth-making had already become fully established: for who 
would invest in a capital-costly mill without a large preexisting clien- 
tele of local, resident cloth artisans? For Miller, the true importance of 
rural locations lay in cheap labour for the carding, combing, spinning, 
and weaving processes, which together accounted for 70 to 90 percent 
of the pre-finishing labour costs in producing woollens.34 
For Carus-Wilson, however, the true importance of the generally hilly, 
rural West Country regions, to explain why it indeed became the primary 
zone of the new English cloth industry, was in offering some of the best 
possible sites for mechanical fulling mills: with fast-flowing streams that 
could provide much more efficient and thus cheaper power for the 
traditional undershot water-wheels, which revolved by the direct impact 
of the river-flow on their veins or paddles; and, secondly, with lower 
opportunity-cost sites on such streams in these much more sparsely 
settled and largely pastoral rural regions.35 The traditional eastern low- 
land textile towns and their immediately adjacent countryside in con- 
trast suffered from slow-moving streams, presumably too weak to power 
fulling mills. Furthermore, this far more densely populated urban region 
of late-thirteenth-century England would have provided far more com- 
petition for the use of scarce river sites, especially in the larger towns, 
thus raising the opportunity costs in establishing fulling mills there. 
Bridbury and other critics have pointed out, however, that from the 
time of Domesday thousands of water-mills can be found in eastern low- 
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land England; and furthermore, that almost all of them served as grain 
mills, because most manorial lords and towns found flour-milling far 
more profitable than mechanical fulling. Indeed, very recently Richard 
Holt has endorsed that contention, after examining the revenues from 
hundreds of manorial accounts in this region." That valid point, how- 
ever, does not really contradict the implicit assumptions of the oppor- 
tunity-cost argument; and it is doubtful therefore that it would be equally 
valid for the more pastoral, thinly populated West Country, especially 
in the later Middle Ages (for reasons to be noted below). 
Carus-Wilson's critics have also overlooked an important technolog- 
ical point: that these eastern mills, in using direct rotary power to grind 
flour, could not be so readily adapted for fulling. For fulling mills require 
cam shafts and trip-hammers to convert rotary into reciprocal power, 
i.e., to lift and drop the heavy oaken fulling-stocks. That in turn required 
a much a more efficient form of water power, which, however, could 
be produced by using overshot wheels on any slow-moving river. For 
they use only about one-quarter as much water as undershot wheels, 
and derive their power from the weight of the water falling on to the 
buckets attached to the wheel; and thus the speed of the stream is 
largely irrelevant. Their disadvantage, in terms of production costs, was 
a very large capital investment and much higher maintenance costs. 
Overshot mills were far larger and more complicated in structure than 
undershot mills, especially in requiring canals to divert the river water, 
mill ponds and sluice gates to store the water, and mill races with high 
wooden chutes to pour the water over the top of the wheel, i.e., onto 
the attached buckets. On the other hand, the location of these struc- 
tures at some distance from the river may have meant lower opportu- 
nity costs and thus lower rentals than for undershot mills located directly 
on the river site, provided that the necessary canals did not impede 
river navigation, especially in dams to create millponds, or interfere with 
alternative uses of the river site. 37 
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Furthermore, overshot wheels might have provided little assistance to 
the later-medieval English cloth industry, despite their far greater efficiency, 
because of their rather late introduction into England. The very earli- 
est evidence for them comes from a depiction in the famous Luttrell 
Psalter of the 1330s; and another from an archeological site at Batsford, 
Sussex, of this same era. Historians of technology seem generally agreed 
that overshot fulling-mills were not widely used within England before 
the early sixteenth century.311 In two other respects, Carus-Wilson has 
also misdated her 
"English industrial revolution of the thirteenth century": 
first, long before any fulling-mills were established in England (1173), 
they were being used in Italy (from 962) and Normandy (from 1086); 
and, secondly, in England, many more can be dated from after the 
1320s than from before. 39 
Certainly from the mid- to later fourteenth century, a large number 
of chiefly undershot fulling mills came to be employed throughout the 
English woollen industry; and Carus-Wilson's critics have been unfair 
in dismissing the longer term cost advantages of this mechanical process. 
For quite precise data from later-medieval and early modern textile 
industries in the Low Countries and Italy (Florence) indicate, by various 
comparisons, that fulling-mills provided about a 70 percent gain over 
foot-fulling; and, in the late-medieval Flemish and Dutch draperies, foot- 
fulling accounted for about 20 percent of the draper's valued-added 
manufacturing costs, which could certainly mean a major difference 
between his profit or loss.4° Such comparisons, however, may indeed be 
19 
valid only from the later-medieval and post-Plague era, when fulling 
mills may have acquired or increased their relative cost advantages for 
two major reasons: (1) the evident rise in real wages and thus labour 
costs, possibly if not indisputably the consequence of drastic depopula- 
tions and consequent changes in the land : labour ratios; (2) a relative 
fall in grain prices-relative to textile prices-especially by the early to 
mid-fifteenth century, which may have reduced the opportunity costs of 
using a water-mill for cloth fulling, especially if many grain mills had 
fallen out of use with the sparser populations and the falling demand 
for grain and thus falling prices for flour. 
To complete her fulling-mill thesis, in explaining the supposedly rural 
nature of English cloth-making from the fourteenth century, Carus- 
Wilson cited obstruction from urban fullers' guilds to prevent the instal- 
lation of any mills that would have led to "technological unemployment." 
At the most, however, she provided very misleading evidence for such 
opposition;" and she grossly exaggerated the powers of medieval urban 
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craft guilds, which, according to recent historians of late-medieval English 
towns, were really subservient to merchant-dominated urban govern- 
ments and could not impede industrial innovations." 
Crises in English and Flemish textile manufactu7in_,u, 1290-1340: Mediterranean 
and west European warfare, rising tran.saction costs, and industrial reorientation 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, the undisputed decline of the 
major textile towns in eastern England had nothing whatsoever to do 
with fulling mills, urban guilds, town governments, civic taxation, or 
various other urban restrictions or impediments cited to explain a sup- 
posed but undocumented rise in industrial costs and thus a supposed 
industrial exodus to the countryside." Nor did it have anything to do 
with any "growing influx" of Flcmish and Brabantine woollens, a con- 
tention also quite unproved in all respects, and also unbelievable with 
the current industrial crisis that the major drapery towns in the cross- 
Channel Low Countries were themselves then undergoing. On the 
contrary, these traditional English textile towns had devoted their export- 
oriented production during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries primarily 
to very cheap and light fabrics directed principally to the populous 
Mediterranean towns (Christian and Muslim) with warm climates that 
provided ready markets for such textiles; most of the imports of Flcmish 
and Brabantine textiles were far higher quality and more expensive 
woollens, whose commerce did not vitally affect the traditional English 
textile industries; and their unquestionably severe industrial crisis, from 
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the 1290s to the 1330s, was the consequence of exactly the same set 
of destructive forces that were inflicting, at this very same time, an 
equally severe crisis upon the cheaper-line sayetteries and other draperies 
légères, in towns large and small, in both Flanders and Brabant. 
That very complex set of negative economic factors had been bred 
by warfare, from the 1290s, throughout the entire Mediterranean basin, 
in western Christian, Byzantine, and Muslim realms alike, and in west- 
ern Europe itself, and by the consequent disruptions to long-established 
European trade networks. To be sure, one might well cavil that war- 
fare had never been absent from medieval Europe; but, from the 1290s, 
warfare did become far more widespread, chronic, indeed incessant, and 
far more costly and destructive to commerce, especially in the Medi- 
terranean basin, than it had been earlier, in the twelfth and thir- 
teenth centuries Flanders' own immediate plight began much closer 
to home, with the Anglo-French and Franco-Flemish wars, from 1293 to 
1318, severely disrupting not only cloth production but even more the 
Champagne Fairs, which had served as the principal trading conduit to 
the Mediterranean basin, where most of Flanders' says and othcr cheap, 
light fabrics had been sold.45 In the western Mediterranean itself, com- 
mercial disruptions had begun even earlier, with the Sicilian Vespers War 
of 1282-1302, involving most of Italy, France, Catalonia, and Aragon. 
Aragon-Catalonia and Castile then became embroiled in chronic, de- 
structive warfare with neighbouring Muslim states (Granada, Morocco, 
Tlemcen) from 1291 to 1340. Meanwhile, in Italy, the Sicilian Vespers 
War had resumed as the Guelf-Ghibelline Wars of 1313-43, involving 
almost continuous foreign interventions, by Catalan, French, German, 
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and Hungarian armies. Indeed, in the late 1320s, an Italian merchant 
blamed these very wars for his inability to transport northern woollens 
from the Champagne Fairs to Genoa.46 Those wars were accompanied 
and then followed by incessant campaigns of mercenary Free Companies, 
who ravaged Italy north to south from the 1330s to the 1360s." In the 
eastern Mediterranean, commercial disruptions had also begun in 1291, 
with the Mamluk conquest of Crusader Palestine, followed by papal 
bans on Muslim trade, the Genoese-Venetian naval wars (1291-99), 
Turkish advances into the Byzantine Empire from 1303, then depre- 
dations of Catalan mercenaries sent to oppose them (1303-12), and 
finally, from the 1330s, anarchic warfare in the Mongol khanates and 
Persia, which had become so important to Italian trade." Immediately 
thereafter, the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and 
then onslaughts of bubonic plague ensured almost continuous commer- 
cial disruptions well into the fifteenth century. 
Of course, despite all these adverse conditions, an international trade 
in textiles continued throughout the later Middle Ages, but it came to 
be conducted in much smaller volumes, with chiefly high-value cargoes, 
at far higher unit costs. Both transportation and a much broader range 
of transaction costs rose sharply, not so much from warfare itself as 
from the almost incessant piracy, brigandage, and trade bans that accom- 
panied these wars;" and from the various forms of war-financing, in 
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high taxes and interest rates, trade licences at exorbitant prices, and 
coinage debasements. 50 Furthermore, because the transactions sector was 
subject to large scale-economies, depopulations and market contractions 
themselves raised these unit costs even further.5' 
In a similar vein, Van der Wee has argued that disruptions to the 
arterial overland continental trade routes, and in particular those involv- 
ing the rapidly declining Champagne Fairs, which earlier, in the thir- 
teenth century, had been so vital to European prosperity, produced a 
severe commercial contraction and then periodic depressions during the 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Reductions in commercial trans- 
actions on these routes had very adverse multiplier-accelerator effects, 
through falling investment, employment, and consumption, radiating 
through a complex myriad of interlacing subsidiary networks for regional 
and local trade, which had once served thousands of towns and villages 
over a vast hinterland.52 While a consequent shift to maritime trade 
24 
may have benefited a periphery of European coastal towns, their rela- 
tive prosperity could not possibly have compensated, in his view, for 
the economic decline in the much larger continental hinterland.s?1 Further- 
more, not only were the costs of Mediterranean seaborne trade significantly 
raised from the 1290s, for reasons just noted, but so were those on 
Atlantic and Baltic sea routes, with naval warfare and chronic piracy 
throughout the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.5+ 
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Under such worsening, chronically adverse circumstances, many 
European textile manufacturers undoubtedly found that long-distance 
trade in cheap textiles was becoming unprofitable during the early four- 
teenth century: that transport and transaction costs too frequently rose 
above the floor-price set for such textiles. Clearly most threatened with 
extinction were those northern producers, Franco-Flemish, Brabantine, 
and English drapers alike, who had exported most of their output of 
cheap textiles over such long distances to Mediterranean markets, essen- 
tially as price-takers, under conditions approaching perfect competition 
(i.e., with almost flat demand curves). While a very wide range of cheap 
fabrics had been marketed in the late thirteenth century, any producer's 
particular fabric in the lowest-price categories-a biffe, say, serge, fustian, 
or coarse light woollen-was very similar to rival fabrics sold by thou- 
sands of other drapers, who individually had almost no power to set 
prices in these southern markets, especially when they evidently became 
fully saturated, around 1300. 55 
As the combined production, transport, and transaction costs in export- 
ing such textiles to the Mediterranean basin rouse above the prevailing 
market prices in those regions, producers of those cheap light textiles 
were evidently forced out of production. The drapers best able to sur- 
vive under such adverse conditions were those who produced the far 
higher-value luxury woollens, for which the rising transport and trans- 
action costs thus represented a much smaller proportion of total costs 
and of the now higher prices, with a lower degree of price-elasticity of 
demand, and one that such drapers were better able to influence. While 
some Flemish, Artesian, and Brabantine towns had indeed become 
famous for high quality woollens well before 1300, such woollens had 
in fact constituted only a small segment of this region's aggregate textile 
production during the twelfth, thirteenth, and very early fourteenth cen- 
turies. Presumably, however, it constituted a larger segment than in thir- 
teenth-century English cloth outputs, for which only Lincoln scarlets had 
had any genuine significance in luxury production.-5" 
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Demand-oriented factors in the industrial reorientation of European textile 
manufacturing 
Furthermore, during or by the early fourteenth century, the structure 
of European demand may have become less propitious for marketing 
the cheaper textiles. Thus, as many historians currently argue, western 
Europe, after having experienced unprecedented population growth dur- 
ing the so-called "long thirteenth century" (ca. 1180-ca. 1315), may have 
experienced a Malthusian crisis, one that grievously aggravated the con- 
sequences of the Great Famine of 1315-22, even if its basic causes lay in 
vagaries of the climate.5' The Malthusian proponents have found their 
best demographic evidence in England, contending that by 1300 it had 
over six or even seven million inhabitants, well in excess of its population 
on the eve of the Industrial Revolution; and several recent studies on 
East Anglia and Norfolk cite data that suggest growing impoverishment 
in many overcrowded villages .5' But more recent studies have reduced 
the pre-Famine English population estimates to a more credible four 
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million; and, furthermore, a close analysis of the Phelps Brown and 
Hopkins wage and price data (chiefly for the Oxford-Cambridge region) 
does not show any appreciable decline in real wages from ca. 1280 to 
1314.59 Elsewhere in Europe, evidence for a sudden fall in population 
from the early fourteenth century, especially in Provence and Tuscany, 
probably reflects the consequences of debilitating warfare and economic 
crises rather than genuine Malthusian crises. 60 
Nevertheless, in many parts of western Europe rising taxation, with 
a disproportionate burden borne by the lower classes, combined with 
all the other war-related economic factors that raised transaction costs 
in marketing cheaper cloths, may have produced more highly skewed 
income distributions that reinforced this same relative shift from the 
cheaper to higher-priced, more luxury oriented textiles in international 
trade,61 i.e., fine woollens, linens, and silks. 12 For the post-plague era of 
rapid depopulations, which also included most of the Hundred Years' 
War era (1337-1453), Lopez, Herlihy, Van der Wee and other historians 
have produced evidence of increasing poverty in many parts of Europe, 
countering the contentions of many other historians that such depopu- 
lations resulted in rising living standards amongst the lower strata of 
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western society For England and the Low Countries, with the best 
wage and price data, such a relative rise in real wages is not evident 
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before the late fourteenth century; and for the rest of later-medieval 
Europe there can be little certitude about trends in real incomes.64 
There remain two other problems that make a demand-oriented eco- 
nomic model of industrial reorientation rather problematic. First, in 
Mediterranean markets, many of the very major customers for says and 
other cheap textiles were aristocratic households, which purchased them 
as livery for their servants, and sometimes as alms for the poor; and 
such still wealthy households would thus been much less influenced by 
such changes in demand in making their purchases. Even if, with more 
highly skewed wealth and income distributions, aristocratic households 
enjoyed a relative increase in the number of their servants, they still 
did not increase their consumption of says and similar textiles, according 
to all the contemporary evidence on textile sales.65 Secondly, evidence 
for such Mediterranean cloth sales does not show that the very high- 
est priced luxurious textiles continued to enjoy the best markets. On 
the contrary, some cheaper versions of quasi-luxury woollens, so long 
as they were priced above a floor set by the combination of transport 
and transaction costs, came to displace many of their higher-priced com- 
petitors in these markets 
Furthermore, similar shifts from cheaper to more luxury-oriented tex- 
tile production can be documented elsewhere, and even in the Mediter- 
ranean basin itself, particularly in Catalonia and especially in Italy, 
though this industrial phenomenon was hardly universal For undoubtedly 
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some cheap textile industries bordering on the Mediterranean survived 
on the basis of a major comparative advantage in transport and mar- 
keting costs; and even if most of them had evidently been well estab- 
lished by the thirteenth century, some new entrants may have thrived 
as import-substitution industries to serve local markets precisely because 
of these rising transaction costs in long-distance trade. The economics 
of international comparative advantage in cheap textiles, therefore, may 
have eliminated most remaining holdouts in England and the Low 
Countries, except for a very few, such as Hondschoote and Arras, that 
could survive by serving local or particular regional markets that were 
not yet so adversely affected by rising transaction costs. In fourteenth- 
century England some considerable exports of cheap, light worsteds, 
very similar to Flemish says, continued to be supported by sales in Baltic 
markets, at least until the 1360s; but then they too radically declined, 
when such markets began to suffer from afflictions similar to those that 
had plagued the Mediterranean from much earlier in the century." 
The resurgence of the English cloth trade from the 1350s: rural or 
urban-based production? 
When the English cloth-export trade recovered to regain and then dra- 
matically to surpass its former importance, from the 1350s, it became 
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more and more oriented to higher quality, more luxury-oriented woollens: 
and indeed, in almost mirror-image fashion, broadcloth exports soared 
while those of worsteds plunged, the latter virtually disappearing from 
the 1380s. Nevertheless English clothiers and merchants could not or 
did not seek to compete with the traditional Flemish and Brabantine 
urban draperies, nor with the newly expanding Florentine cloth indus- 
try, in the very uppermost echelons of the luxury markets. Instead, and 
indeed perhaps more wisely, they concentrated their efforts upon the 
lower-priced and thus much broader-ranged segment of the luxury or 
quality markets, with woollens that were from one half to one third the 
price of the better Flemish, Brabantine, and Florentine luxury woollens. 
Even so, with cloth exports in the range of £2 Os. Od. to 10s. Od. 
sterling apiece (24 yd by 1.75 yd), such woollens were far from being 
cheap and vastly more expensive than worsteds; and in the later four- 
teenth century, such broadcloths would have cost an English master 
mason (Oxford-Cambridge, Exeter, Canterbury), then earning 5d.-6d. 
per day, from 80 to 120 days' wages, the latter representing over half 
a year's full incomes 
That English clothiers and cloth-export merchants were not then 
more ambitious and indeed not immediately more successful in com- 
peting with their cross-Channel rivals in luxury cloth markets is all the 
more surprising in view of their supposedly decisive advantages in pro- 
ducing high-quality woollens. As already indicated, most historians have 
assumed that the resurgence of the English cloth industry, with a boom- 
ing export trade from the 1350s, was based upon the relatively new 
rural locations whose combination of water-powered fulling and cheap 
peasant labour permitted much lower-cost production than was enjoyed 
by the Flemish, Florentine, or any other overseas urban rivals. 
As suggested earlier, the one major scholar not sharing these opti- 
mistic views on rural advantages is A. R. Bridbury, who has instead 
shown that this "new" English cloth industry remained largely urban 
until well into the fifteenth century, when a variety of complex factors 
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finally did combine to produce a somewhat more prominent shift to 
rural cloth-making.'° Curiously enough that later shift, such as it was, 
occurred at the very time or soon after Edward IV had subjected English 
cloth production, in town and village alike, to national and crown-super- 
vised industrial regulations ( 1464-65)." For the later fourteenth century, 
when the English cloth export trade was rapidly expanding, the national 
aulnage accounts, recording taxes on manufactured woollens, provide 
quite firm evidence to indicate that well over half of those cloths pro- 
duced for the market, and evidently an even greater share of the pro- 
duction destined for foreign markets, came from towns, large and small, 
rather than from agricultural villages. To be sure, Carus-Wilson herself 
had cast doubts on the validity of the late fifteenth-century aulnage 
accounts (perhaps to quash any notion of any remaining urban vitality 
in cloth production);72 but Bridbury and, before him, H. L. Gray, do 
provide good grounds for the credibility of the earlier accounts and for 
the belief that the locations named were those where the cloth was ac- 
tually produced, rather than taxed and sold.73 Furthermore, there is 
much abundant evidence for the impressive importance of both new 
and older urban centres in cloth production. In the West Country itself, 
Bristol, Salisbury, Gloucester, Worcester, and Exeter became leading 
urban cloth-manufacturing centres, most of them dependent upon urban 
merchants and financiers in expanding their production.'4 
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Of equally great importance is the evidence that virtually all of these 
West Country and West Midlands cloth towns used fulling-mills, if not 
necessarily within the town, certainly close by the town, without any inter- 
ference from resident fullers and their guilds.75 They were not alone. The 
next most important cloth-producing region in later-medieval England, 
and one whose importance was unfairly ignored by Carus-Wilson, was 
East Anglia, which contained several towns, such as Colchester, that 
had earlier achieved importance as textile exporters, during the thirteenth 
century, and revived in importance, along with many other new towns 
during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, in particular numer- 
ous small towns, but towns nevertheless, which lay on or near the Colnc 
and Stour rivers, the latter forming the boundary between Suffolk and 
Essex. Many and perhaps most of them also used fulling mills, powered 
by these same rivers, slow-moving though they were; and again these 
mills were located either in or more commonly just outside the town 
walls." With its many draperies, in both villages and towns, East Anglia 
with adjacent Norfolk was a region certainly far more prominent than 
the West Riding of Yorkshire, let alone the industrially marginal Lake 
District, to which Carus-Wilson gave much greater significance, evi- 
dently because they appear to have been more distinctly rural, as water- 
powered textile producers in the later Middle Ages." 
Furthermore, in eastern lowland and southern England, apart from 
East Anglia, several of the older traditional cloth towns that had sup- 
posedly expired during the late thirteenth-century urban industrial crisis 
subsequently managed to regain an important if lesser role in fourteenth- 
century English cloth-manufacturing: York, Winchester, London, Lincoln, 
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and Leicester. 7R In so doing, the drapers or clothiers of most of these 
older cloth towns also resorted to fulling-mills, though chiefly in adjacent 
rural sites." To be sure, Lincoln, Leicester, and the other traditional 
eastern seaboard industrial towns never did regain their former promi- 
nence in export-oriented cloth production; but York did come close, 
before finally declining in the later fifteenth century, for reasons to be 
examined in the conclusion to this study. 80 
The same was true of Winchester, in the southern county of Hampshire, 
which, from the mid-fourteenth century, certainly recovered some of its 
former stature as an export-producer, before also declining in the mid 
fifteenth century. As this town's eminent historian Derek Keene has 
demonstrated, the bishop of Winchester built a ncw fulling-mill in the 
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1360s, at Prior's Barton, just outside the city, adjacent to a long estab- 
lished civic fulling-mill (dating from the 1220s), which produced revenues 
that more than doubled between 1370 and 1400. In 1402, Winchester's 
town government built an additional fulling-mill; and in 1406, the bishop 
farmed the Prior's Barton mill to a Winchester entrepreneur, who, some- 
time before 1422, converted an episcopal water-mill, at Durn's Gate, 
into yet another fullitig-mill." As should be self-evident, with no evidence 
for any compulsion employed in the use of these mills, they would not 
have attracted capital investment for their construction, elicited continuous 
business from the civic fullers and drapers, and increased their mill- 
revenues, unless they had provided substantial cost-savings over tradi- 
tional foot-fulling.82 Indeed, the urban fullers of Winchester came to 
own, lease, and operate some of the four town-sponsored fulling-mills, 
which, in Keene's view, "strengthened the urban industry rather than 
promoting its migration into the countryside."" 
In sum, therefore, the contention that the English cloth industry's 
supposed shift to a rural location, in the early fourteenth century, to 
acquire both cheap labour and cheap water power, along with greater 
"industrial freedom," was the primary factor responsible for its remark- 
able resurgence and then ultimate victory, is unfounded. First and fore- 
most, low wages do not necessarily mean lower cost labour, even if the 
actual wage differentials between town and countryside could be meas- 
ured. If economists are justified in believing that the market wage rate 
is determined by labour's marginal revenue product (MRP), one might 
well suspect that labour productivity was indeed lower in the country- 
side, especially when so many rural textile workers were not specialised 
craftsmen but part-time workers in both agriculture and industry. Further- 
more most worked at home unsuperviscd, some perhaps in nucleated 
villages in mixed farming regions, but others, in more pastoral regions, 
in scattered houses, so that production was all the more difficult to 
monitor. That monitoring problem explains, of course, why virtually all 
textile wages were paid by the piece rather than by the day (the latter 
prevailing in the construction trades). 
Such questions of rural productivity and the attendant problems of 
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monitoring may have been less significant, however, for the preliminary 
stages of cloth production, even if they did account for perhaps 50-60 
percent of pre-finishing labour costs: i.e., wool-beating, sorting, cleans- 
ing, and greasing; combing (warps) and carding (wefts), and spinning 
the two types of yarn (by drop-spindle and the wheel, respectively).?`? 
Yet, if we were able to prove that in England, the Low Countries, Italy, 
and elsewhere such economic advantages were derived from having 
these preliminary tasks performed in the countryside, and in having 
dependent female labour perform most of them, such advantages would 
not necessarily have led to rural locations for cloth-manufacturing per se. 
For much evidence indicates that many urban textile industries in all 
three of these regions, even in their medieval heyday, had acquired 
their yarns from the adjacent countryside.?' Urban cloth-making thus 
meant the much more specialised, capital-costly crafts of weaving, fulling, 
dyeing, shearing, and ancillary finishing processes, which were the only 
ones to be guild organized, in both the Low Countries and England. 
For mechanical water-powered fulling, however, the advantages for 
a rural location, in terms of cheaper power and lower opportunity costs, 
may be accepted as soundly based in economic theory; but even so, as 
the English historical evidence has indicated, urban clothiers were not 
precluded from using fulling-mills in the adjacent countryside. The rel- 
ative advantages of mechanical fulling themselves will be reconsidered 
later, in the subsequent analysis of the changes imposed on urban 
draperies in the later-medieval Low Countries, an analysis that will also 
consider the peculiar advantages of an urban location for performing 
the crucial tasks of guild-organised dycing, shearing, weaving, and fulling, 
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especially in response to growing English competition in the European 
cloth trades." 
The role of taxation and fiscal policies in the rise of the Eyaglish broadcloth 
trade, 1336-1429 
There remains, however, a third, final, and indeed quite powerful expla- 
nation for the rise and ultimate victory of the English cloth trade over 
most of its continental rivals: a far lower fiscal burden on wools, as the 
key ingredient and indeed determinant of luxury-quality woollens. The 
relative changes in those fiscal burdens, involving export taxes, stapling 
regulations, and various bullionist impositions, in affecting the fortunes 
of cloth manufacturers on both sides of the Channel, took place dur- 
ing and over five distinct periods, thus explaining in part why the English 
victory took so long to be achieved: in the 1330s, the 1360s, the 1390s, 
the 1430s, and the 1460s. In essence, the English crown rightly looked 
upon the wool-export trade as by far the easiest and by far the most 
lucrative source of tax revenues and especially of ready cash. For medieval 
England produced in vast abundance by far the world's best wools, with 
very curly, extremely fine, short-stapled fibres that had excellent felting 
qualities when fulled; and that superlative reputation for fineness did 
not encounter any serious challenge until the mid-sixteenth century, 
when Spanish merino wools, whose production evidently had begun only 
from the 1340s, finally achieved superior qualities, through some com- 
binations of cross-breeding and changes in flock management.? Evidently 
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the English crown perceived a foreign demand for at least the finer 
English wools that was or became relatively inelastic. Certainly from 
the 1330s, when the cloth industries of the Low Countries and of Italy, 
Florence especially, reoriented their textile production more and more 
towards luxury woollens production, they became exclusively dependent 
upon those finer English wools, at least for their export trades. When 
Edward I levied the first export duty, as the Old Custom of 1275, those 
continental cloth industries were by no means so fully dependent on 
English wools; and that initial rate was quite modest, at 6s. 8d. per 
woolsack (of 364 lb), perhaps about 7 percent of the current mean 
export value. 81 
That tax structure was abruptly and brutally altered in 1336, on the 
very eve of the Hundred Years' War, and _just when the Flemish cloth 
industry was undergoing its reorientation to luxury production. Edward 
III and his specially convened Great Council imposed an additional 
export subsidy of 20s. Od. per woolsack, which he increased to 33s. 4d. 
a sack in March 1338 and to 40s. Od. a sack in November 1341, for a 
total tax burden of 46s. 8d. a sack (50s. Od. a sack for alicns) .81 Subse- 
quent merchant assemblies and parliaments periodically confirmed that 
high rate up until 1362, when the subsidy was temporarily halved; but 
the following year, Edward III made the recently conquered French 
port of Calais the official and compulsory wool staple for all wool exports 
to northern Europe, governed by a mercantile cartel that was designed 
to pass this tax incidence more fully on to foreign buyers (i.e., rather 
than on to the domestic wool-growers in lower prices), in part by fixing 
uniform minimum wool prices for each county. That same year Parliament 
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restored the wool subsidy to 40s. per sack; and then, in 1369, increased 
it to 43s. 4d. per sack, for a total duty on native exporters of 50s. Od. 
a sack (51s. 7d. with an added Calais Staple import duty). 
Arguably, however, for a variety of reasons, the Calais Staple did 
not become a fully effective cartel in achieving this goal of transmitting 
the tax burden until the 1390s.? By this time, the real burden of the 
wool-export duties, which were s p ecific rather than ad valorem, and thus 
levied as a fixed amount per sack, had increased substantially because 
of the stark deflation that had beset northwestern Europe from the late 
1370s, bringing with it a fall in nominal wool prices. As a consequence, 
the wool export taxes now amounted to virtually 50 percent of the 
mean export prices of the better grades of English wools; and, accord- 
ing to records of the Flemish, Dutch, and Brabantine urban draperies 
for the early fifteenth century, these tax-burdened English wools were 
accounting for about 70 percent of their pre-finishing manufacturing 
costs 
English clothiers, however, were not subjected to any such burdens, 
for they were able to buy the very same high quality wools totally free 
of tax to produce cloths, which, when exported, bore a very minor duty 
of 12d. per broadcloth by Hanseatic merchants (from 1302), and 14d. 
per cloth by denizen merchants (untaxed before 1347); and these export 
taxes remained unchanged until 1558. In the late fourteenth, early 
fifteenth century these specific duties amounted to no more than 2 to 
3 percent of the mean value of exported woollens. 12 In sum, we may 
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reckon from all these tax calculations that English fiscal policies had 
unintentionally but effectively given the native cloth industry a major 
cost advantage of about 25 to 30 percent, in producing medium-qual- 
ity woollen cloths. 
Some economic consequences of these English fiscal and Staple poli- 
cies can be readily seen in the export and continental production statistics 
for the second half of the fourteenth century, expressed in quinquen- 
nial means. English wool exports rose, not fell, after the Black Death, 
to reach a peak of 32,544 sacks (5,373.26 tonnes) in 1355-59; but, there- 
after, with the imposition of the Calais Staple requirements and higher 
export duties, wool exports fell 46 percent by the end of the century, 
to a mean of 17,546 sacks in 1395-99. A corresponding fall in pro- 
duction indices for some of the Flemish and Brabantine urban draperies 
can also be seen in Table 1. Meanwhile, English broadcloth exports 
soared from a mean of just 7,231 pieces in 1355-59 to a peak of 40,096 
pieces in 1395-99, a rise of 455 percent. Over this forty-year period, 
total English exports, measured by combining woolsacks and broadcloths 
at 4.333 cloths per sack, experienced an overall decline of 22 percent, 
rather less than the aggregate fall in European population, providing 
another indication of the inroads that the English cloth trade was mak- 
ing into the contracted markets of its overseas competitors by the end 
of the fourteenth century."' 
The Flemish-Brabantine cloth industries during the disastrous fourteenth century: 
the traditional urban draperies and the nouvelles draperies in towns 
and villages 
That the urban cloth industries of the southern Low Countries wcrc 
still managing to survive in the 1390s is all the more amazing when 
one recites the full litany of disasters that had befallen them in the cen- 
tury since the 1290s: the loss of their Mediterranean markets for cheap 
and light textiles, probably the largest segment of their industrial pro- 
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duction; the impact of widespread chronic warfare and war related activ- 
ities in disrupting or contracting markets, and in raising transaction costs 
in servicing those markets, for the better-quality lines of textiles on which 
these industries refocused; the rise of the competitive quasi-rural nou- 
velles draperies within the southern Low Countrics; the expansion of a 
rejuvenated and new English cloth trade; and the related impact of tax 
and other fiscal measures on the English wool trade, on which the Low 
Countries' draperies had become so dangerously dependent; the Black 
Death and subsequent drastic depopulations, which, along with the mil- 
itary strife of the Hundred Years' War era, dramatically reduced their 
remaining markets; and, finally, the so frequently disruptive impact of 
guild strife, especially between weavers and fullers, within the Flemish 
urban cloth industries especially. 
For Flemish textile production, certainly by far the most destructive 
manifestation of that guild strife, though by no means the exclusive ele- 
ment within it, was the Ghent-led civil war, or the so-called Second 
Artevelde Rebellion, of 1379-85, which also involved both English and 
French military intervention; and even the crushing Burgundian-French 
victory at West Roosebeke in November 1382 did not bring peace for 
another three years. Nor did Ghent's submission and the truce of 
December 1385 permit any real recovery. For the German Hanse towns, 
led by its Baltic members, after failing to gain reparations for war dam- 
ages, imposed a trade embargo on Flanders, from 1388 to 1392. Taking 
very quick and strategic advantage of these Flemish difficulties were 
both English and Dutch cloth merchants, th<: latter in particular pro- 
moting exports from the recently established Leiden cloth industry, to 
invade and capture important Baltic markets; and the English successes 
are clearly reflected in the sharp rise in the export statistics. Yet the 
English, and to a lesser extent, the Hollanders became involved in their 
own conflicts with the Baltic Hanse; and as a result, English cloth exports 
to the Baltic, having peaked around 1402, then experienced an irre- 
deemable decline in this region, an important factor that subsequently 
encouraged the London-based Merchants Adventurers to seek a new 
continental outlet for English woollens.9+ In 1420, they established their 
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permanent overseas headquarters at Antwerp, the one major port town 
in the Low Countries that no longer had an important cloth industry 
to protect and one that readily welcomed the subsequent influx of English 
wooliens."5 
For the first two decades of the fifteenth century, however, the cloth 
industries of the southern Low Countries had managed to stage an evi- 
dent comeback, with some semblance of an Indian Summer of pros- 
perity, though one necessarily based on far smaller and much narrower 
European markets than these industries had enjoyed a century and more 
earlier. According to Hektor Amman, in an exhaustive study of early 
fifteenth-century German and other central European markets, Flemish 
woollens, especially including those of the drie steden, had regained their 
former preeminence, followed by the Brabantine and then Dutch wool- 
lens, while the much cheaper English broadcloths now or still ranked 
a very distant fourth.9' A more recent study by Abraham-Thisse largely 
supports that view on cloth markets, though her much narrower range 
of sources indicated a relatively greater prominence in Baltic markets 
for medium-priced Flemish and Artesian textiles.`" In the early fifteenth- 
century Mediterranean markets, the Florentine and other Italian luxury 
woollens, from various towns in 'I'uscany and Lombardy, had gained 
clear ascendancy, at the direct expense of those from the Flemish drie 
steden and major Brabantine towns. But many of Flanders' smaller-town 
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nouvelles draperies, especially those of Wervik, Kortrijk, Comen, and Menen, 
were more than holding their own in selling very good quality and quite 
high priced heavy-weight woollens, though they would soon face a new 
challenge from Catalan cloth producers, which were evidently now using 
better quality merino wools, as were some Italian draperies.98 But again, 
as in the Baltic, sales of English broadcloths still fared badly (along with 
a very few cheap worsteds and "streits"); and indeed the English cloth 
trade would not succeed in making major gains in the Mediterranean 
basin, despite all its reputed advantages, until later in the fifteenth cen- 
tury, and especially after the formerly prominent Flemish nouvelles draperies 
of Wervik, Kortrijk, and Comen were themselves suffering a severe 
industrial and commercial decline, along with the traditional urban 
draperies of Bruges, Ypres, Ghent, Brussels, Mechelen, and Leuven.99 
Urban institutions and the survival of the Low Countries' draperies: 
fulling and the fullers' guilds 
Since the ultimate decline of the traditional urban draperies in the south- 
ern Low Countries is indisputable, since the evidence of cost advan- 
tages of mechanical fulling is compelling, and since fulling was such a 
crucial process in the manufacture of genuine heavy-weight woollens, 
now the predominant form of textile manufacturing, the absence, or 
supposed absence, of fulling-mills in the traditional urban cloth indus- 
tries of the medieval Low Countries must be reexamined. This ques- 
tion is all the more important in the light of relatively recent evidence 
that demonstrates the widespread and evidently effective use of fulling- 
mills in many of the so-called nouvelles draperies-not those just listed 
above-and other cloth industries of sixteenth-century Flanders, Brabant, 
and the bishopric of Liege (Vesdre region). Must we therefore conclude 
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that in the medieval Low Countries urban guilds and the governments 
that supported them are to be faulted for preventing such mechaniza- 
tion and thus industrial innovations in general?'°° 
Carus-Wilson, in advancing her "industrial revolution" thesis to explain 
the ultimate English victory in the international cloth trade, necessarily 
had to consider this particular question, to which she supplied two 
answers. The first now seems to be clearly wrong: that "Flanders like 
Lincolnshire is a land of windmills, not water-mills."'°' On the contrary, 
water-mills proliferated throughout medieval Flanders and all of the 
southern Low Countries. Furthermore, as Van Uytven has clearly demon- 
strated, fulling-mills themselves can be found in several small-town 
draperies in the southern Low Countries during the thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries: in Artois, Namur, the bishopric of Liege, and in 
Brabant, particularly in the major urban drapery of Leuven. 102 In Flandcrs, 
to be sure, the drie .steden did not use fulling-mills; but thcir town gov- 
ernments did operate and/or lease water-driven grain mills throughout 
the entire medieval era."" There was no compelling technological rea- 
son why these mills could not have been adapted for fulling, as they 
were in the late-medieval English cloth towns, certainly if those towns 
had been both willing and able to invest in the much more complex 
but more powerful overshot wheels, with mill races. 
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Carus-Wilson, as she had done for the English part of her thesis, 
also provided an ancillary, if redundant, reason for the Flemish failure 
to use fulling-mills: prohibitions by the urban cloth guilds, "which were 
not less conservative than those in England, and very much more power- 
Powerful they certainly came to be after 1302, especially in the 
drie steden, but there were no such prohibitions, certainly none recorded 
in the often voluminous guild keuren of the drie steden and of the smaller 
towns. By far the most extensive set of fullers' regulations to survive, 
largely for the second half of the fourteenth century, are those for Ypres, 
the weakest of the drie steden, the one most susceptible to rural compe- 
tition from the nouvelles draperies, and especially those on the nearby Leie 
river, in a region much more suitable to undershot waterwheels than 
any other region in Flanders. Yet no reference to fulling-mills can be 
found within the 114 articles of this Ypres fullers' keure; and provisions 
stipulating that four days' labour be devoted to fulling broadcloths and 
from two to three days' for "small" (i.e., narrow) woollens clearly estab- 
lish that foot-fulling was the only mode then considered.'°5 
Even if mechanical fulling had been technically feasible, the fullers' 
guilds of the drie steden never enjoyed the unilateral power to prevent 
its use, even when they occasionally participated in urban coalition gov- 
ernments. In all the towns, the fullers, as the wage-earning employees 
of the weaver-drapers, the true industrial entrepreneurs, were almost 
always the weaker party, with a clearly defined subordinate status in 
the town governments of Bruges and Ypres. In Ghent, after many dec- 
ades of often bitter strife, the defeated fullers were permanently evicted 
from the ranks of the town schepenen (aldermanic council), shortly after 
1361; and henceforth town-appointed officials supervised their guild. 106 
In the drapery towns of neighbouring Brabant and Holland, the fullers 
had even less influence with urban governments that merchants and 
merchant-drapers so strongly dominated; and in Leiden the mercantile 
gerecht brutally suppressed several fullers' strikes and rebellions during 
the fifteenth century. 107 
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In all of this guild strife, in Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, the 
major issue was wages; and if the fullers' wages accounted for about 
20 percent of the value-added manufacturing costs, the weaver-drapers 
had a very strong incentive not just to control wages but to reduce 
those labour costs. If, however, they did not seek to do so by installing 
fulling-mills, not even in the face of steadily rising costs and mounting 
competition from the English and Italian cloth-export trades, during the 
, 
later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they had good reason to dis- 
dain mechanical fulling, which did not offer them any possible avenue 
of salvation. Having been forced to reorient textile manufacturing for 
export markets, and thus having so resolutely staked their fortunes on 
producing the very finest luxury-quality woollens, those who dominated 
these urban draperies evidently feared that mechanical fulling would 
have had very adverse consequences upon the international reputation 
of their woollens. For in this era, the belief was widespread that the 
incessant pounding of the heavy oaken hammers in fulling-mills would 
degrade the very finest woollens, made from the most delicate, thin- 
fibred wools, if not the medium grade woollens. Even if this view had 
been exaggerated, these urban drapers would have taken no chance 
that mechanical fulling would debase the cloth-seals that were the ver- 
itable sine qua non of their success in international markets.'O' 
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The governments of the Flemish drie steden in particular had all the 
more reason to be concerned about the international reputation of their 
woollens and consumer confidence in their cloth sales, because of the 
noxious competition from many of the domestic nouvelles draperies that 
evidently engaged in imitating, if not counterfeiting, the very fine wool- 
lens of the drie steden. Contrary to much of the published literature on 
these industries, the so-called nouvelles draperies did not produce cheap, 
light textiles during the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. To be 
sure, much earlier, during the twelfth, thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries, many of these villages draperies had produced light says, tire- 
taines, doucken, and other cheap worsted-like fabrics; but from the 1330s 
those rural draperies that did manage to survive followed the drie steden 
in reorienting production more and more to luxury-quality woollens, 
as heavy as any of those from the drie steden. Some imitated the drie 
steden's woollens not only in their dimensions and textures, but also in 
their selvages and seals-or so the latter complained. 109 The leading nou- 
aelles draperies of this era-Wervik, Kortrijk, Menen, Comen (Comines), 
Linselles-sold their good quality woollens for prices ranging from one- 
half to two-thirds those of the drie 
.steden, but generally well above those 
for exported English woollens, as indicated in Table 2. Evidently their 
drapers were able to do so by using lesser quality English wools, in 
lesser quantities, with simpler manufacturing techniques. Certainly, with 
the aid of Italian merchants who invested in their draperies, these par- 
ticular nouvelles draperies proved to be very successful in capturing some 
Mediterranean markets at the direct expense of the drie 
There is no evidence, however, that even those who led or domi- 
nated the nouvelles draperies situated on the faster-flowing portions of the 
Leie river in southern Flanders ever sought to reduce costs and thus 
prices by resorting to fulling-mills-not in this era; and the voluminous 
fullers' keure of Wervik, issued in 1397, differs in no significant respects 
from the previously discussed keure for Ypres, and it certainly has no 
references to fulling-mills."' Subsequently, however, during the sixteenth 
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century, many of these Leie Valley draperies reoriented production once 
more towards the production of cheaper fabrics, including semi-worsteds 
and bays, which did require some fulling; and in so doing, they read- 
ily adopted fulling-mills. So, during the course of this same century, did 
many drapcrs in Leuven,, Hasselt, and some other towns in neighbouring 
Brabant, in manufacturing similarly cheaper fabrics.112 Thus, Leuven's 
drapers resumed the use of mills that their forefathers had abandoned 
during the early fourteenth century, when, according to this town's lead- 
ing historian, Raymond Van Uytven, they had "switched over" to the 
production of luxury woollens production for export markets. The 
same had been true of many draperies in Normandy, where, during 
the later Middle Ages, only a few fulling-mills were retained, principally 
for le.s gros draps bureaux, de grosses et mauvaises laynes.11' 
If sixteenth-century drapers, in producing lesser quality woollens and 
serges, found that mechanical fulling was effective in reducing costs, 
would the same have been true for those fifteenth-century drapers who 
produced luxury woollens, had there been no valid concerns about 
impairing their quality? To be sure, as demonstrated earlier, fulling- 
mills might have reduced the weaver-draper's value-added manufac- 
turing costs or labour costs from about 20 percent with foot-fulling to 
5 percent with mechanical fulling."' But that cost saving would not nec- 
essarily have enhanced his profit margins by any significant degree, 
because that cost reduction would have permitted, at best, only a 3 per- 
cent reduction in the wholesale prices of his broadcloths."? The reason 
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for such a very meagre price reduction is, of course, the fact that indus- 
trial labour accounted for only about 15-20 percent of his total costs 
for a finished cloth, while the raw mater-ials-the fine English wools 
and the costly dycs-accountcd for the other 80-85 percent, and thus 
for most of the wholesale price. Indeed, the structure of English wool 
export taxes, as a fixed specific duty per woolsack, actually encouraged 
drapers in the Low Countries and Florence to buy the best and most 
expensive wools, for which this tax would thus represent a lower per- 
centage of the wool price. Since the finer woollens of the Flemish drie 
steden and other drapery towns in the Low Countries were already about 
three times more expensive than rival English broadcloths (see '1'able 2), 
such a very minimal price reduction of 3 percent would not have gained 
them many new customers; and any such gains would not have offset 
the loss of former customers who refused to buy mechanically-fulled 
luxury woollens, not when they still remained so high in price com- 
pared to English broadcloths. This point may be better understood by 
examining the economic principles that explain how most drapers in 
the Low Countries' came to price their luxury woollens. 
Towns artd ike economics of monopolistic-competition in the Low Countries' 
draperies 
Such a luxury orientation in textile manufacturing certainly found its 
economic justification by the very survival of the Flemish urban luxury 
draperies for almost a century, from the 1340s to the 1440s. But the 
economics of both supply and demand-of wool costs and cloth mar- 
kets-forced the drapers in the Flemish drie steden to exercise their own 
comparative advantage in the upper-range luxury market, while neces- 
sarily relinquishing the lower ranges to rival woollens, especially the 
English, Norman, and those of the nouvelles draperies. Obviously, a mar- 
ket for ultra-luxury woollens, each worth about 160 days' wages for a 
master mason, at double or triple the price or more of these rival cloths 
would ultimately become a rather small one. 1 17 If still a lucrative market 
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for a select coterie of survivors, it became for the Flemish drie steden a 
fiercely competitive one, in quality more than in price. Their products, 
after all, had to compete with cach other's textiles, and with other 
Flemish, Brabantine, Dutch, Norman, and Florentine luxury-quality 
woollens, let alone with the English. 
Economists would call this monopolistic competition, in which the cloth 
producers had become price-makers, rather than price-takers, each selling 
unique or distinctly different woollens, which had, however, close sub- 
stitutes. For the late-medieval Low Countries, this form of monopolis- 
tic competition was also peculiar in that the competitive price-making 
unit was not the individual draper or family firm or partnership, but 
rather the urban drapery and its guilds organised as a collective unit, 
under urban government supervision."R Ideally, each town drapery would 
maximize profits, for each brand of cloth, when its marginal costs 
equalled marginal revenue: i.e., by establishing both optimum output 
and price from the intersection of MR = MC. The marginal revenue itself 
was determined by the slope of the demand curve for that particular 
woollen, which in turn was shaped by current consumer preferences for 
substitute woollens within that price range. Each drapery therefore implic- 
itly strove to steepen that slope, to reduce the price-elasticity of demand, 
by diverting consumer demand away from rival woollens. That meant 
enhancing the quality of its own woollens, while distinguishing them 
from all other rival products. Obviously, the Flemish urban draperies 
sought considerable assistance from their civic governments in achiev- 
ing these goals. One of the very first steps taken by the drie steden, from 
at least 1359, was to prohibit any importation and sale of English wool- 
lens within Flanders, a ban rigorously and effectively enforced until the 
late 1490s. "y 
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For these Flemish draperies in particular, and for late-medieval com- 
merce in luxury textiles, we must reconsider the role of towns them- 
selves and guilds, and especially of guild and urban government industrial 
regulations. The crucial role that these urban institutions played in their 
century-long reprieve was in defining and enforcing the requisite quality 
controls for this international competition: to establish the highest pro- 
duction standards; to provide and supervise proper training of appren- 
tices and journeymen; to impose such standards and training uniformly 
on all members of the collective drapery; and to provide customers with 
a convincing guarantee of such quality controls in the form of lead seals 
that signified inspection by town officials at key stages of production. 120 
Surely such inspection by town-employed officials would not have been 
effectively enforced without the willing cooperation and internal modes 
of compulsion or sanctions supplied by the guilds themselves, with their 
master-apprenticeship training system. 
Not only guilds and urban government institutions but urban con- 
centration itself was doubly necessary for effecting such quality controls 
in cloth production. In the first place, no matter how literate the drap- 
ers were, or how efficient in record keeping they became, concentra- 
tion of the work force permitted a much more effective coordination 
and monitoring of the very highly refined division of specialized labour 
required for luxury production. Secondly, that concentration clearly per- 
mitted a more effective and efficient inspection and enforcement of 
industrial regulations. In other words, Van Werveke was correct in his 
original thesis, but for the wrong reasons.'2' 
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Obviously monopolistic competition in luxury textiles had a long- 
standing tradition. Thus urban industrial regulations for such high-priced 
textiles can be found in thirteenth-century Flemish and Artesian towns, 
well before the shift to luxury production, though of course the bulk of 
the cheap-textile production that focused on largely undinerentiated pro- 
duction had been left unregulated. Nevertheless, briefly, from ca. 1285 
to ca. 1310, the Franco-Flemish towns had subjected one important 
branch of the cheaper light drapery, the sayetteries (or its dra?e.rie-sayetterie, 
branch) to at least some detailed regulation. That may have represented 
a valiant but ultimately hopeless attempt to upgrade the quality of these 
textiles, in the face of rising transaction costs, for the reasons suggested 
earlier.' 2' Then, from the 1330s, Flemish and Brabantine urban indus- 
trial regulation became far more complex, reflecting this more general 
and increasing shift to luxury cloth production: far more encompassing, 
detailed, and meticulous in dictating especially quality controls.123 Ad- 
mittedly some Flemish drapery regulations were designed to protect cm- 
ployment and income, with contracting markets; but obviously also 
some limitations on entry (of labour and capital), along with stipulated 
production techniques, were still requisite for the proper training of arti- 
sans and for enforcing quality standards. Although many of these indus- 
trial ke.uren-in Flanders, Brabant, and Holland-prohibited the use of 
cards and spinning wheels in the preparation of warp yarns (though 
generally not the wefts), such bans were fully justifiable on the grounds 
that these techniques, while greatly increasing productivity, seriously 
impaired the durability and quality of luxury woollens, or arguably did 
57 
so before the introduction of the Saxony Flyer-Wheel in the late fifteenth 
century.' 24 
By the 1330s, of course, some members of the Flemish cloth guilds 
were playing a more active role in town governments, which evidently 
facilitated the enactment, acceptance, and enforcement of industrial reg- 
ulations. Furthermore, during the fifteenth century, the Flemish nouvelle 
draperies also came to imitate the drie stede.n's industrial organization as 
well as their textiles. Certainly the leading draperics, those of Kortrijk, 
Comen, Mencn, Wervik, and subsequently those of Armentieres and 
Neuve-Eglise as well, lost whatever semi-rural character they had once 
enjoyed to become more fully urban in their structures, with the full 
panoply of industrial keuren, urban regulations, urban inspections, and 
cloth In neighbouring Brabant and Holland, even though craft 
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guilds were unable to exercise similar political powers in their town 
governments, the urban drapery regulations became just as meticulous 
and complex as those in the Flemish drie steden.126 That difference in 
craft-guild power may explain, however, why the Flemish drie steden had 
succeeded in enforcing a permanent ban on the import of English wool- 
lens, while the drapery towns of Brabant and Holland-Zeeland failed 
to do so, after one abortive attempt in That, of course, took 
place just when a rapidly growing volume of English cloth imports via 
Antwerp and Middelburg had become so important to both merchants 
and cloth-finishers in these two principalities.128 
The final crisis for the urban draperies of the Low Countries: the Calais 
Bullion ordinances, 1429-73 
In so concentrating upon luxury or quasi-luxury (imitation) woollen pro- 
duction, both the traditional urban draperies in the Low Countries and 
most of the bigger nouvelles draperies had purchased their survival by mak- 
ing their industry hostages to the English crown, which evidently believed 
that foreign demand for English wool still remained inelastic-even if 
the demand for the Low Countries' fine woollens was not so very inelas- 
tic.129 From 1429 to the 1470s, during the crucial denouement of the 
Hundred Years' War and its aftermath, the crown sought to extort more 
bullion and ready cash from the wool trade by imposing the disastrous 
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Calais Staple Partition and Bullion Ordinances. These laws placed the 
Staple's wool trade more firmly in the hands of a small monopolistic 
Stapler clique, sharply raised wool prices, and forbade traditional sales 
credit, requiring full payment in coin and bullion. Burgundian retalia- 
tion against the English cloth trade, leading to warfare and military 
expeditions against Calais, failed to remove these hated Staple regula- 
tions. Finally, as the price for the duke of Burgundy's financial assis- 
tance in regaining his throne (battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury), Edward 
IV had Parliament revoke these noxious ordinances in 1473. 131 
During the crucial forty years of these ordinances-years also of 
plagues, warfare, severe depressions, and especially another ruinous 
Flemish conflict with the Hanse (1451-57)-the Flemish and Brabantine 
urban draperies suffered their most precipitous decline, and then vir- 
tual collapse before the real onslaught of the English cloth trade, whose 
expansion from the 1460s was compared in the Low Countries to an 
inundacioni maris As Table I indicates, the mean production 
indices for the Ghent, Ypres, Leuven, and Mechelen draperies all fell 
about 70 percent from 1425-29 to 1475-79. More concrete evidcnce 
can be found in the 84 percent decline in the number of drapery stalls 
rented in the Ypres cloth hall over this period, from a mean of 377 
stalls to just 59. Equally tangible if less dramatic is the 38 percent drop 
in mean English wool exports over this same period, from 14,179 sacks 
to 8,792 sacks (to Calais itself: from 13,255 sacks to 7,590 sacks)."" Of 
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the traditional, urban, English-wool based cloth industries, only the 
Leiden drapery weathered these storms, with some relative success, 
because of support from an aggressive Dutch merchant marine that was 
then invading and displacing the Hanse in the key Baltic markets, while 
taking advantage of several Flemish-Hanse conflicts to expand Dutch 
cloth sales there; and by the end of the century the Hollanders had 
gained a decisive mastery over Baltic commerce.' i?; 
In 1467 the Burgundian ambassadors had vainly warned the English 
that their badly damaged draperies in the Low Countries would soon 
"be forced to give up cloth-making or else obtain wool from else- 
That may have been an idle threat from the leaders of the 
traditional urban draperies de luxe; but not for many of the younger, more 
aggressive nouvellev draperie.s. In so far as they had been industrial "coun- 
terfeiters," they were much more inclined to seek out other substitutes, 
which they were now finding in Spain's recently improved merino wools, 
even if they remained quite inferior to the finest English wools (March, 
Cotswold, Lincolnshire), as noted earlier.135 For many years, several of 
the leading nouvelles draperies, such as those of Wervik, Kortrijk, Diksmuide, 
and Langcmarck, had all refused to make that substitution, contending 
that to do so would cost them customers; and Wervik had long required 
its drapers each year "to swear a holy oath upon the cross to use none 
but English wools."13íJ By the 1460s, however, many drapers had adopted 
Spanish wools, though the Wervik town government permitted them 
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only for petits draps.137 Earlier, in the 1440s, Brussels had established a 
Spanish-wool based nouvelle draperie, though its government also required 
it to be separate from the traditional drapery, which reinforced the tra- 
ditional ban against adulterating its English Staple Those gov- 
erning the Flemish urban draperies, however, refused to engage in such 
Spanish-wool based cloth-manufacturing until far too late, on the seem- 
ing verge of extinction, in the sixteenth ccntury: the Ghent drapery, 
evidently not before 1519; 139 and the Bruges drapery, not before 
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Towns and industrial transformation in sixteenth-century textiles in the 
Low Countries and England 
Must we therefore conclude that urban guild-enforced regulation in 
Flanders, which had rescued the traditional draperies from destruction 
in the fourteenth century, now doomed most of them to extinction from 
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the later fifteenth, by refusing to adjust to radically changed circum- 
stances in both wool supplies and markets? The most important com- 
mercial changes lay in the dramatic expansion, from the 1460s, of the 
Brabant Fairs of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, largely propelled by 
the booming English cloth trade, the revival of transcontinental routes, 
and especially a renewed growth of exports to the Mediterranean basin, 
where a multitude of densely populated markets again favoured the 
sale of cheaper textiles. 141 The evident beneficiaries were, first, some of 
the newer nouvelles draperies, in particular Armentieres and Neuve-Eglise 
(Nieuwkerke), which had adopted and become more and more reliant 
on Spanish merino wools, whose sales volumes in the Low Countries cer- 
tainly exceeded those of English wools by the 1520s." Nevertheless, 
the governments and guilds of the Flemish drie steden were not misguided 
or wrong-headed in refusing to adopt Spanish merino wools; for many 
other nouvelles draperies that had resorted wholly or partially to Spanish 
merino wools failed to sustain their earlier growth and had also experi- 
enced severe decline in the later fifteenth century. 141 
Furthermore, the case of the sixteenth-century Leiden drapery is most 
instructive in analysing comparative wool usages. As just noted, the 
Leiden drapery had been better able to sustain the growing onslaughts 
from the English cloth trades.144 But by 1521 Leiden's cloth outputs had 
peaked (at 29,987 woollens);1"7' and in June 1522, after encountering 
further difficulties at the Calais Staple, the Leiden gerecht (magistrates) 
officially authorized the use of Spanish merino wools, which were now 
25 percent cheaper than the English. But even so, I,eiden's drapers used 
merino wools only in limited quantities, usually mixed with some English 
wools. Soon complaints arose that Spanish merino wools were not only 
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less fine than the English, but were more difficult to comb and required 
more time and effort in fulling and felting. Indeed, the contemporary 
English writer Clement Armstrong contended (ca. 1535) that "the wolles 
of Spayn are of such kynds [that] withowt the wolles of England be 
myxed with, it can no make no clothe of itself for no durable weryng, 
to be nothcr reisid nor dressid, by cause it hath no staple"; and indeed 
many of the leading nouvelles draperies, such as Armentières, used a mix- 
ture of two thirds Spanish and one third English wools.1+6 Subsequently, 
in 1536, after Leiden's experiment with merino wools had failed to stave 
off a continued decline in sales, its governing drapers decided once more 
to use English wools exclusively, despite their high cost, in order to safe- 
guard their woollens' reputation and thus maintain their now limited 
cloth markets, in confronting the relentless growth of English competi- 
tion.1+7 The continuing importance of English wools for many of the 
Low Countries' draperies is well attested by the royal customs accounts: 
in 1475-79, as noted earlier, mean wool exports were 8,792 sacks; and 
in 1515-19, they were just 12.8 percent less: 7,671 sacks. Over this forty- 
year period, mean exports amounted to 8,012 woolsacks, sufficient to 
produce at least 34,718 broadcloths (of English measurement). 14" 
The other major sector of the textile industries in the Low Countries 
that bencfited from the changing structure of European markets and 
trade routes after the 1460s were the now fully revived sayetteries, led by 
Hondschoote, which, as in the thirteenth century, produced cheap, light 
semi-worsted textiles, woven from coarse, long-stapled Flemish, Frisian, 
German (Pomeranian and Rhenish), and French wools. Indeed by the 
early to mid-sixteenth century they had surpassed the Spanish-wool 
based nouvelles draperies to bc:come the leading manufacturers of textiles 
(certainly by volume and employment) in the southern Low Countries. 
According to one recent estimate for the mid-sixteenth century, the sayet- 
teries and other draperies légères were then producing 3.64 million metres 
of cloth, whilc output from the nouaelles draperies and the few remaining 
traditional urban draperies, now led by Mechelen, was only about 2.07 
million metres."19 
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Although Hondschoote had once been a village, it had become a 
full-fledged town by the early sixteenth century, with a fairly extensive 
and rigorous set of industrial regulations.150 Furthermore, all of the major 
towns in the Low Countries themselves established similar sayetteries or 
other draperies légères in the course of the sixteenth century; and this 
important industry had also become almost exclusively urban.l5' Then, 
during the Revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule (1568-1609), 
many Flemish artisans, especially artisans from these .sayetteries, fled from 
the Spanish armies that reconquered the south to seek refuge in Holland, 
especially in Leiden, where they established the nieuwe draperie, which 
supplanted the now declining woollen-bascd oude draperie. Even more set- 
tled in East Anglia and Norfolk, especially in and around Norwich, the 
former medieval homeland of English worsteds. Throughout this region, 
they also reestablished this worsted and serge-based industry, which, as 
the so-called New Draperies of Tudor-Stuart England, also outstripped 
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the traditional woollen-based Old Draperies, by the 1640s. In both 
Holland and in England this say-based set of New Draperies was dis- 
tinctly urban in organization and character, thus again raising questions 
about the supposed advantages of a rural location for early modern tex- 
tile industries producing for international markets. 152 . 
Rural textiles in early modern England: Some reflections on the 
Proto-Industrialization debate 
Nevertheless, despite the generally urban character of the New Draperies 
in Tudor England, one of their most important offshoots, especially for 
the Stuart and Hanoverian eras, was the hybrid linen-cotton fustian 
industry that subsequently migrated to Lancashire, adjacent areas of 
north-west England, and Scotland. It would be absurd to deny that this 
vital industry, developing into the full-fledged cotton industry of the 
modern British Industrial Revolution, had distinctly rural foundations 
in this new region, with a heavy reliance on an agrarian workforce. 
Clearly even the true cotton manufacturing (in warp and weft) of the 
early Industrial Revolution era experienced no major shift from coun- 
tryside to large towns, to steam-powered urban factories, before the 
Several other crafts as well, the metallurgical in particular, also 
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followed differing paths towards modern uban industrialization by trans- 
forming their fundamentally rural modes of production. 
Another set of manufacturing crafts that also did so (by the 1850s), it 
must now be conceded, were in fact the woollen and worsted industries 
of early modern England, or many of their members, producing as well 
sllfffs and other hybrid fabrics.154 Even if this study has supported Bridbury's 
contention that the late-medieval English cloth industry had remained 
substantially more urban, certainly for export-oriented production, than 
has been commonly assumed, until well into the fifteenth century, nev- 
ertheless a subsequent shift of cloth-manufacturing from the larger provin- 
cial towns to much smaller ones, indeed to quasi-villages may certainly 
be detected. 
Thus, Heather Swanson, in an exhaustive regional study, has demon- 
strated that York still remained a major textile-producing city until the 
early 1460s, by which time cloth exports from Hull, Ipswich, Boston, 
and other north-eastern ports had suffered a dramatic and permanent 
decline, after English defeats in ruinous conflicts with the Hanseatic 
League and Denmark, and with the final losses of Baltic, Scandinavian, 
and Prussian markets.155 Other cloth-producing towns, notably Bristol, 
suffered from England's final defeat in the Hundred Years' War, and 
the loss of Gascony, by 1453; and others from conflicts, trade bans, 
and even sporadic war with the Burgundian Low Countries 
Indeed, for other reasons as well, primarily demographic, monetary, and 
financial, the middle decades of the fifteenth century were ones of 
extremely harsh agrarian, industrial, and commercial depression, during 
which aggregate English cloth exports fell 45.4 percent, from an annual 
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mean of 57,056 broadcloths in 1440-44 to one of just 31,161 cloths in 
1460-64.157 Thereafter, as noted earlier, the combination of the South 
German silver-copper mining boom, the dramatic expansion of the over- 
land continental trades linking Italy, South Germany, and the Low 
Countries, and the consequent flourishing of the Brabant Fairs pro- 
moted an eighty-year long boom in the English cloth trade, expanding 
exports 3.75 fold, to reach an annual mean of 117,345 broadcloths in 
But, the traditional provincial ports and the major cloth 
towns that they had long served did not share in this dramatic cloth- 
export boom, which was almost entirely canalised upon the Antwerp 
market, as the virtually sole gateway to continental markets. London's 
share of total cloth exports therefore rose from 42.5 percent in 1430- 
34 to 68.5 percent in 1495-99 (and to 84.9 percent in 
In Swanson's view, York's cloth industry experienced a rapid decay 
from the 1460s chiefly because of this drastic fall in exports from the 
nearby northeastern ports, which thereby undermined the ability of mer- 
chants in those ports and in York itself to finance further cloth pro- 
duction. Cloth manufacturing deserted the town of York for various 
smaller towns and quasi-villages in surrounding areas of Yorkshire's West 
Riding: not to escape any urban or guild restrictions, not to seek lower- 
wage rural labour, but principally to secure the now much more acces- 
siblc, abundant and cheaper capital supplied by many prosperous 
landowners and sheep-farmers in this region, with the concomitant 
growth in the Tudor enclosure movement. Futhermore, during this same 
era, local clothiers from Halifax, Leeds, Ripon, Wakefield, Bradford, 
Doncaster, and other small Yorkshire towns bypassed York to establish 
their own direct connections with London-based merchants.'?° 
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More recently, Pamela Nightingale has offered substantial evidence 
to support a similar thesis for the contemporary industrial declines of 
Coventry, Winchester, Colchester, Leicester, with shifts of cloth-manu- 
facturing to neighbouring small towns and villages. She demonstrates 
in particular the disastrous effects that the severe contractions in the 
money supply, as well as in overseas commerce, had upon traditional 
sources of urban credit, during this mid-century depression, but far more 
so in the provincial towns than in London, whose urban economy expe- 
ricnced relative growth over the entire century. In the countryside that 
surrounded the formerly prominent provincial cloth-towns, she also found 
that some relatively prosperous landowners and yeomen farmers rcad- 
ily supplied abundant credit on much easier terms than urban merchants, 
many of whom indeed were forced to vacate this financial field entirely 
(except in London). She also analysed the contemporary rinse of rural 
chapmen, as itinerant peddler-broker merchants, operating on very low 
overheads, who also assisted in financing cloth production in the new 
cloth-making centres, often providing barter arrangements to secure 
more woollens for direct transport to London. They also cooperated 
with the now expanding London-bascd merchants, who sought out many 
more industrial clients throughout the small country towns of East Anglia, 
the Midlands, Yorkshire, and the West Country, to meet the ever more 
voracious demands for woollens in London's Blackwell Hall, i.e., for re- 
export to the rapidly expanding Brabant 
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Thus this study should not be construed as an assault upon the proto- 
industrialization thesis per se, and its now vast literature, which has pro- 
vidcd some exceptionally valuable insights into the rural roots of modern 
industrialization. Rather it seeks to modify aspects of that debate in 
three respects. First, the evidence adduced here shows that in late- 
medieval and early modern Europe the countryside did not necessarily 
offer clear advantages for textile production over towns, many of which 
continued to offer superior advantages both for ensuring quality pro- 
duction and for marketing textiles, especially the finer ones.162 Second, 
the advantage that smaller centres in the countryside came to acquire 
did not necessarily lie in terms of cheaper labour, but rather, as in the 
English examples just cited, in more promising developments in financial 
credit and marketing networks.163 Thus, historical analyses of later- 
medieval and/or early modern shifts of industrial production from tra- 
ditional towns to the countryside must be more closely examined according 
to their own peculiar sets of circumstances. Third, in doing so, we must 
establish more precise definitions of the terms "rural" and "agrarian 
roots" of industrialization. How many of the smaller and very small 
cloth-producing centres that came to flourish in the later-medieval or 
early modern Low Countries and England were truly "rural," i.e., fun- 
damentally agrarian in their economies ? How many that were once 
quasi-agrarian villages- -such as Hondschoote or Armentières in Flanders, 
and Lavenham, Halifax, or Manchester in England-developed into 
genuine towns in which agricultural pursuits played only a marginal 
role in relation to the industrial, commercial, and financial developments 
that textiles so effectively fostered? Do we gain a better perspective on 
the economic development of early modern Europe by resorting to 
unnecessary dichotomies between "town" and "countryside"; or should 
we instead seek to delineate the factors that came to determine, dur- 
ing these long eras, a complex hierarchy of large cities, major towns, 
small towns (kleine staden, in Flemish), and industrial villages 
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